Identifying Corruption Bottlenecks in Subsidiary Companies of Public Non-Governmental Institutions: A Study Based on a Three-Dimensional Model

Document Type : Research Article (with qualitative approaches)

Authors
Hosein Jamour 1
Erfan Seifikar 2
Masoud Banafi 3
1 PhD candidate in Business Policy Management, Faculty of Management and Accounting, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, and Researcher at Islamic Parliament Research Center (IPRC), Tehran, Iran.)
2 Master's student in Crisis Management, Islamic Governance Department, Faculty of Humanities and Islamic Sciences, Islamic Revolution Comprehensive University and Researcher at Islamic Parliament Research Center (IPRC), Tehran, Iran.
3 Assistant Professor, Cultural and Social Department, Faculty of Governance, School of Management, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
10.48308/jpap.2026.243050.1537
Abstract
Purpose: Administrative and economic corruption in subsidiary companies of public non-governmental institutions represents a complex governance challenge due to the hybrid nature of these organizations and their ambiguous position between the state and the market. These companies hold a substantial share of national economic resources while simultaneously facing weak accountability, limited transparency, and fragmented oversight. This study aims to identify and conceptualize corruption hotspots in subsidiary companies of public non-governmental institutions by developing an integrated analytical framework based on a three-dimensional model encompassing structural, behavioral, and contextual dimensions.
Design/ methodology/ approach: This study adopts an applied, qualitative, and exploratory research design. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with 14 academic and executive experts selected using purposive sampling. Participants possessed extensive managerial experience or specialized expertise related to subsidiary companies of public non-governmental institutions, pension funds, and administrative integrity. The data were analyzed using thematic analysis, a deductive approach, following systematic stages of coding and theme development. Based on the extracted themes, the study developed a three-dimensional analytical framework to capture the interaction among structural, behavioral, and contextual factors shaping corruption.
Research Findings: Beyond the existing literature, this study indicates that the sources of corruption in the subsidiary companies of non‑governmental institutions should be understood through the interaction of structural, behavioral, and contextual dimensions to more accurately reflect the complexities of this domain. The findings show that corruption hotspots in these companies fall into three interrelated dimensions. At the structural level, corruption-prone procurement systems, inefficient budgeting practices, and weak corporate governance constitute the primary bottlenecks. Manifestations include fictitious transactions, stock price manipulation, opaque budget reallocations, unrealistic financial reporting, and ambiguous ownership structures. At the behavioral level, managerial politicization, the granting of exclusive privileges, unregulated asset transfers, and rent-seeking and collusive practices were identified as key drivers of corruption. These behaviors largely stem from weak accountability mechanisms and institutionalized conflicts of interest. At the contextual level, frequent regulatory changes, international sanctions, macroeconomic instability, and a relationship-oriented organizational culture create an environment conducive to the persistence and reproduction of corruption. The results indicate that weak corporate governance plays a foundational and amplifying role, rendering isolated behavioral or cultural reforms largely ineffective without institutional redesign.
Limitations & Consequences: The study's qualitative nature, limited sample size, and focus on the Iranian institutional context constrain statistical generalizability. Nevertheless, the analytical depth and contextual transparency enhance the conceptual transferability of the findings to other public and quasi-public organizations with similar governance structures.
Practical Consequences: The study offers practical guidance for policymakers, supervisory bodies, and corporate boards by highlighting critical corruption hotspots. It underscores the need for targeted structural reforms, strengthened accountability mechanisms, transparent budgeting and procurement systems, and enhanced corporate governance independence within public non-governmental subsidiary companies.
Innovation or value of the Article: The principal contribution of this study is a comprehensive, context-sensitive three-dimensional framework for analyzing corruption in subsidiary companies of public non-governmental institutions. By moving beyond single-factor explanations, the study shows that corruption results from dynamic interactions among structural, behavioral, and contextual forces, providing a robust foundation for both theoretical advancement and effective anti-corruption policymaking.
Paper Type: Original Paper
Keywords
Corruption Bottlenecks
Three-Dimensional Model
Subsidiary Companies
Public Institutions
Non-Governmental Institutions
Thematic Analysis
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