Public Administration Perspective

The Effect of Social Feedback on Belief Updating and Cooperative Behavior: Experimental Evidence from a Threshold Public Goods Game

Document Type : Research Article

Authors

1 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Governance, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

2 Master's degree graduate, Institute for Cognitive Science Studies, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Purpose: This study examines whether a simple, low-cost social intervention – normative feedback – can override materially grounded beliefs and substantially increase collective cooperation, even in high-threshold coordination problems. Specifically, it tests whether accuracy-independent external rewards (social norms and feedback) can counteract or compensate for accuracy-dependent material payoffs in a threshold public goods game.
Design/ methodology/ approach:  The research was experimental and conducted within the framework of game theory and value-based models of belief updating. The initial sample consisted of 35 individuals (18–42 years old; minimum bachelor’s degree) who participated in a binary threshold version of the public goods game (5 players: 1 real participant + 4 simulated players). The design consisted of two blocks: the first block (rounds 1–6) without social feedback and the second block (rounds 7–12) with social feedback; each block consisted of 6 rounds and each round consisted of 15 games. The threshold (k) was randomly set to 2 or 4 in each round. The main variables were “probability of participation” and “probability of group success,” and the analyses focused on comparing means and examining the effect of adding social feedback (an external outcome independent of accuracy) on participation patterns. The software implementation method was designed based on PsychoPy and data were collected in a controlled environment.
Research Findings: The findings showed that adding social feedback (an example of an external outcome independent of accuracy) significantly increased the contribution rate of participants; Even in situations where participants naturally tend to be “free-riding,” the level of contribution approached that which would normally be considered “contribution.” The results also suggest an interaction between the external outcome dependent on accuracy and the external outcome independent of accuracy; that is, the effect of the external outcome dependent on accuracy on behavior is moderated by the presence or absence of social feedback. Contingent variables such as the threshold for participation (k=2 vs. k=4) also showed different behavioral interactions, allowing for analysis across different situations.
Limitations & Consequences: Limitations of this study include the relatively small sample size (after data filtering, the analyzed sample reached 24 people), the experimental dimension and the artificiality of some aspects of the task (simulating other players), as well as the limited range of outcomes examined (focusing solely on external outcomes and avoiding examining internal outcomes). These limitations may affect the generalizability of the results to broader populations and to natural settings, and it is suggested that future studies consider larger samples, more inclusive conditions, and simultaneous examination of internal outcomes. Furthermore, the study tested only two threshold values ​​(k = 2 and k = 4); small changes in the threshold value can destabilize group dynamics, create multiple equilibria and tipping points, and increase the likelihood of coordination failure and reduced cooperation, so it is necessary to examine a wider range of thresholds.
Practical Consequences: The findings suggest that manipulating “external outcomes independent of accuracy” (e.g., designing social feedback, modeling peer behavior, or providing social approval/condemnation) can be a low-cost and effective strategy to shift collective behavior toward cooperation and promote collective participation, especially in situations where directly changing accuracy-dependent outcomes is costly or impossible. This insight can be applied to public policy, the design of behavioral interventions (nudges), and citizen engagement programs. Additionally, in government organizations, such as executive departments or municipalities, designing social feedback systems (such as displaying colleagues' collaborative behaviors or publicly recognizing positive performance) can reduce free-riding tendencies and increase cooperation in collective projects (such as implementing local development plans or crisis management).
Innovation or value of the Article: The value of the research lies in two areas: (1) theoretical; providing an empirical test of the explicit interaction between two types of external outcomes within the framework of a revised belief updating model that has been understudied in the literature; and (2) applied; demonstrating that accuracy-independent social outcomes can serve as important “low-cost belief change tools.” Furthermore, the integration of the threshold public goods game paradigm with the accuracy/accuracy-independent framework strengthens the methodological and conceptual innovation of the paper.
Paper Type: Original Paper
 

Keywords

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Public Administration Perspective
Volume 16, Issue 4 - Serial Number 64
January 2026
Pages 33-54